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A year ago, assessing the health-care situation, Enza Caruso and Nerina 
Dirindin wrote: “The year 2007 can only be described as a positive one 
for health in terms of planning, given the great number of programs 
launched, commissions and councils put in place, and protocols of 
agreement signed by the Ministry for Health. Finance within the health 
sector was also notable for complying with the health pact and the rig-
orous control of public accounts backed up by deficit reduction plans, 
which regions under financial warning had to observe scrupulously or 
be put under compulsory administration.”1 The year 2008, however, 
began and then continued with a shocking series of health-care mis-
management cases, including the controversy over the appointment 
procedure for general managers and chief medical officers of health-care 
providers, the question of controlling health expenses, and the possible 
compulsory administration of regions that are unable to meet deficit 
reduction plans. This brought the issue of the relationship between 
health and politics—and the influence of the latter over the former—
back into the public arena. Furthermore, 2008 was an unusual year for 
the Italian health system because it was the thirtieth anniversary of the 
passage of Law No. 833, which in 1978 had transformed health insur-
ance into a national health service, the Servizio Sanitario Nazionale 
(SSN). Thus, especially at the end of the year, there have been many 
opportunities to reflect on and evaluate 30 years of health policy.2
Notes for this chapter begin on page 218.
204 Franca Maino
After taking into account the relationship between health policy and 
welfare, referring to their reorganization at the ministerial level and 
the green paper on welfare, and after assessing the issues related to 
the control of health expenditure in connection with deficit reduction 
plans and, more generally, plans to introduce federalism, this chapter 
analyzes the principal episodes of health mismanagement in Italy and 
discusses the relationship between health care and the Mafia, as well 
as the appointment of general managers and chief medical officers of 
health-care providers. In the conclusion, we ask whether a “partyoc-
racy” in the health sector may be making a comeback at a regional 
level rather than, or in addition to, the national level. 
The New Minister and the Green Paper on Welfare 
As a result of the collapse of the Prodi government and the early 
elections, the year 2008 was also characterized by the interruption of 
government action begun by Minister of Health Livia Turco in 2006. 
Following the victory of the coalition led by the Popolo della Libertà 
(PdL), the Ministry of Health was handed over to Maurizio Sac-
coni. This transfer also coincided with the establishment of a single 
Ministry for Work, Health, and Social Policy and hence, despite 
widespread criticism after the vote, the inclusion of health in this 
new ministry.3
A few months after the establishment of the new ministry, the 
“green paper on welfare” was introduced with the purpose of prepar-
ing—through a process of public consultation—the reorganization 
of all the main areas of social policy: social security, welfare, social 
benefits, and health care. The reality is that the green paper devotes 
only a few pages to health, and it does so in a manner that is not very 
organized or systematic. There is an analysis of the main problems of 
the SSN, but the suggested solutions are not articulated as a compre-
hensive reform plan for the health system. Rather, they are scattered 
throughout the document, often linked to the reorganization of other 
policy sectors.
Overall, the green paper seems to suggest three areas of strategic 
intervention: prevention, regional health promotion, and biomedical 
research. As regards finance, the document emphasizes the impor-
tance of setting up a second private tier to complement public health 
care, which would be put in place through the development of inte-
grative health funds. It also advocates the implementation of fiscal 
federalism and an end to the allocation of financial resources at a 
regional level on the basis of past levels of expenditure. Finally, the 
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importance of evaluating and monitoring services is highlighted, sug-
gesting the relaunch of the Agenzia Nazionale per i Servizi Sanitari 
Regionali (Age.Na.S., National Agency for Regional Health Services)4 
and the use of methods for monitoring services similar to those in the 
UK, following the adoption of the NICE (National Institute for Clinical 
Excellence). However, although it refers to these themes (particularly 
the relaunching of integrative health funds), the green paper does not 
clarify whether and in which way these measures could bring into 
question the principle of universalism (as feared by many).
Limiting Health Expenditure: Plans for  
Deficit Reduction and Federalism 
In 2007 and 2008, the problem of health expenditure reared its head 
again. As shown in the annual government accounts, the level of debt 
of the Aziende Sanitarie Locali (ASL, local health authorities) and hos-
pital trusts exceeded 51 billion euros compared to the previous year, 
growing by 11 percentage points. It should also be taken into account 
that health costs as part of overall regional expenses increased from 
80 percent in 2005 to 83.5 percent in 2007.5 Against this background, 
some regions—Lazio, Sicily, Campania, Abruzzo, and Molise—stand 
out as being constantly in the red in the last few years. In these regions, 
the level of debt recorded by health-care providers has continued to 
grow more than in others. 
Until the beginning of 2000, patterns of regional expenditure were 
guided by expectations of central government deficit repayments. In 
the long term, this created a highly unbalanced situation, pitting a few 
well-organized regions, able to keep health expenses under control, 
against others under a heavy burden of accumulated debt. Taken as 
a whole, the SSN deficit can be seen as almost entirely due to a few 
regions with a high and persistent deficit level. The preferred solu-
tion to this situation has been the identification of selective measures 
directed specifically at disadvantaged regions rather than measures 
indiscriminately aimed at all regions. 
These selective measures were the result of agreements between 
the state and the regions6 and a national legislative framework,7 which 
established the criteria by which regions are entitled to integrative 
state funding and defined terms and conditions of deficit reduction. 
During 2007, the regions of Lazio, Campania, Abruzzo, Molise, Ligu-
ria, and Sicily signed agreements with the state that included plans for 
reducing their deficit. These plans, based over three years, 2007–2009, 
are aimed at re-establishing the economic and financial stability of 
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the six regions. By identifying and analyzing the underlying structural 
causes affecting the emergence of significant management deficits, 
they are intended to single out and selectively address the different 
problems faced by each region. 
The plans take the form of a true restructuring program that will 
have an impact on those elements of expenditure that the regions have 
failed to control. Fiscal discipline measures related to deficit reduction 
plans envisage the following:
•  an increase in tax rates to the maximum level established by cur-
rent legislation and, where intermediate targets aimed at deficit 
reduction are not met, an increase in the IRAP (regional busi-
ness tax) rates and a regional addition to the IRPEF (personal 
income tax) beyond the maximum legal levels until the missed 
targets are achieved. Conversely, where a region achieves better 
results than expected, there is the possibility of reducing tax 
rates by a corresponding amount; 
•  a temporary additional fund of 1,000 million euros for 2007, 850 
million for 2008, and 700 for 2009;
•   the allocation of 3,000 million euros to the health sector in regions 
affected by the deficit reduction plans and the adoption of addi-
tional fiscal measures on top of increasing the IRAP to the maxi-
mum amount and of imposing a regional addition to the IRPEF;
•  a warning to regions failing to adopt structural measures to limit 
costs that they must fulfill deficit plan requirements. In case of 
persistent failure to comply, a commissioner is to be appointed;
• an audit of the amount of outstanding debt and its redemption.8
Between July and August 2008, the region of Lazio was put under 
central administration as a result of extreme delays in adopting the 
measures required by the plan. This also happened to the Abruzzo 
region, as a result of a delay in adopting the required measures and 
a critical situation as regards the finalizing of funding quotas for the 
health sector. At the beginning of November 2008, the undersecretary 
for welfare, Francesca Martini, announced new procedures of com-
pulsory administration for regions still in deficit, in addition to the 
regions of Lazio and Abruzzo. In parallel, a parliamentary commission 
of inquiry was set up in the lower house to investigate health-care 
mismanagement and the causes of regional deficits. 
The legal instrument on deficit reduction plans, agreed to by the 
central government, envisages a series of obligations that will inevi-
tably result in heavy restrictions on regional governments. The latter 
are in some cases, such as Lazio, experiencing obvious difficulty in 
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managing the deficit reduction problem. Prescription charges are also 
one of the causes of conflict between the central government and the 
Lazio region, given the former’s readiness to impose these charges 
as a means to reduce the level of debt, when it put the region under 
direct administration during the summer following its non-observance 
of deficit reduction commitments. 
The case of Lazio raises more general questions regarding relations 
between the state and the regions in the new SSN framework. The pro-
cedures introduced for managing the deficit reduction plans, in fact, 
give the central government wide powers to direct and control the 
actions of regional governments, jeopardizing the latter’s autonomy. 
At a time when the implementation of the Calderoli bill on federalism 
was being discussed, there was a risk of activating a process of recen-
tralization that could potentially have powerful effects and would con-
cern only the regions that were unable to meet the challenges posed 
by a highly decentralized system.9 Deficit reduction plans underway, 
however, must run their course before any general evaluation can be 
made. It will then become possible to assess their structural impact, 
also with reference to the reorganization of regional procedures on 
planning and expenditure control, which are of strategic importance 
for any future management of regional health services. 
Between July and August 2008, after several years of institutional 
collaboration, the issue of health costs and regional deficits re-exacer-
bated the conflict between central and regional government. Apart from 
the deficit reduction plans, tensions were heightened by the economic 
measures presented by the minister of economy and finance, Giulio 
Tremonti, at the beginning of July. The measures involved cuts in staff 
for health-care providers, reductions in hospital beds, and prescription 
charges even for exempted social groups in deficit regions. All regions, 
including those with their accounts in order and those governed by the 
center-right, formed a common front against these planned cuts. After 
all, the Health Agreement of 2006 envisaged an increase of 3 percent in 
the national health fund from 2008 to 2011 and additional funding to go 
toward the renewal of doctors’ and paramedics’ contracts and to cover 
charges for specialist and diagnostic prescriptions.10 
It should also be taken into consideration that 2008 was the year of 
the Calderoli bill on fiscal federalism, which also widely affects national 
and regional health policy. This legislative decree states that the level 
of health expense must be determined according to “standard costs of 
essential levels of services fixed legally by the state, to be delivered on 
the basis of efficient and appropriate criteria across the national ter-
ritory” (Article 6). It does not, however, specify what standard costs 
are, and on this issue there has been an as yet inconclusive debate. 
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Certainly, the aim of the legislative decree is to avoid resorting to past 
expenses as a criteria for deciding how resources should be allocated 
at the regional level. Many researchers have demonstrated that it is 
unrealistic to calculate the specific efficient costs of individual health 
services and to identify overall needs from the sum total of these costs. 
Therefore, it seems that the best way to calculate standard costs is 
to refer to per capita expenditure in one or more regions, which are, 
overall, considered more efficient. The problem is that regions that 
spend less (e.g., in the South) are not necessarily in a position to offer 
better quality services.11 
The Problems of Health-Care Mismanagement
As far as Italian health care is concerned, the year 2008 started with 
press attention heavily focused on health-care mismanagement due to 
a death resulting from a dental abscess in Vibo Valentia and the imme-
diate creation of a commission to evaluate the quality of health care in 
Calabria. At first sight, there seems to be a two-tier health-care system. 
There are more aberrant cases in the Center and the South, which are 
generally reported in the newspapers, and similarly in these regions a 
higher number of people suffer side effects from their stay in a health-
care facility. The mismanagement of health care in these institutions is 
a particular problem for inhabitants of the South, as shown, following 
several investigations, by the results of Monitor Biomedico in the 2006 
article “The Value of Proximity in Future Health Care.”12 In southern 
Italy and the Islands, 8.6 percent of the population stated that they had 
directly experienced poor health care, a figure considerably higher than 
the national average (equal to 6.2 percent) and over double the North-
East (at 4.1 percent) and the North-West (at 3.6 percent). This is further 
confirmed by asking about side effects caused as a result of a hospital 
stay to people close to the interviewee: 34 percent of inhabitants of the 
South or the Islands referred to friends and family who were victims of 
health mismanagement, compared to 25 percent as a national average, 
16 percent in the North-East, and 25.2 percent in the North-West. 
However, the scandal of the Santa Rita nursing home in Milan, 
which arose in June 2008, showed that there are similar cases in the 
North. The Santa Rita clinic scandal (with similar instances being 
hypothesized in other private clinics in Lombardy) revealed a system 
in which doctors grew rich by taking advantage of patients, even car-
rying out unnecessary operations in order to obtain higher payments 
from the region.13 Following an anonymous accusation sent to the 
police at the beginning of 2007, a picture emerged of a true “clinic of 
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horrors,” with mounting evidence of fraud, blackmail, and ultimately 
the murder of elderly patients.
Roberto Formigoni, the president of the region, following events at 
the Santa Rita clinic, decided to suspend the accreditation contract for 
an indefinite period. The opposition in the regional council of Lom-
bardy countered with a request for a revision of the accreditation sys-
tem, referring, in addition to the arrests in the Santa Rita nursing home, 
to the abuse discovered at the same time at San Raffaele, at Multimed-
ica, and at Humanitas. The opposition said that the Lombardy health 
model had inherent faults and suggested an extraordinary intervention 
in supervisory procedures, strengthening relationships with profes-
sional associations and setting up a commission with the objective of 
rethinking the credit system. The Milan Council’s councilor for health, 
Gianpaolo Landi, emphasized the need to modernize the credit system 
and to revise the reimbursement system. To accomplish this, he sug-
gested the creation of an authority made up of doctors and experts with 
consultative powers alongside, and in support of, regional control. 
The legal response came at the end of 2008 with the approval of the 
first modifications to regulations for the control and accreditation of 
the private clinics. From now on, the accreditation process will have a 
fixed expiry date and will be entrusted to the ASL, as well as the region. 
Managing, medical, and social directors of public and private struc-
tures must be professionally registered, as general directors already are. 
Private organizations with over 250 beds, or which have an accident 
and emergency unit, now have to appoint a medical director.
After the summer break in 2008, the NAS (i.e., the Food Adulteration 
and Health Care Department of the Carabinieri, or national police force) 
made public its report on the SSN. It confirmed that fraud and corrup-
tion damaging the SSN (often with the complicity of medical staff) were 
widespread, costing the Italian people dearly. In the years since 2000, 
the cost to the public was equal to 233 million euros. To complete the 
picture and show how serious the situation was, during the same period 
390 people were arrested, about 4,700 were reported to the authorities, 
and nearly 630,000 prescriptions were found to be falsified. 
Health, Mafia, and Bribes
Health has been, and continues to be, a synonym for power, money, 
votes, and clients. There have been many cases in the newspapers 
demonstrating the perverse relationship between health and politics, 
particularly in regions such as Calabria, Campania, and Sicily. The chief 
prosecutor of the State Audit Court also sounded the alarm during the 
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inauguration of the judicial year 2008, drawing attention to wide-
spread corruption in the public works sector, in public procurement, 
and in the health system.14 Evidence that bribes are being paid out 
seems linked to stratagems and irregularities connected to various 
cases—from fraudulent modification of contracts to preferential treat-
ment in procurement; from collusion with companies providing ser-
vices to illicit contract awards and bids to provide supplies to public 
health-care providers; from falsified overbilling to false statements on 
the progress of improvements and the modernization of medical build-
ings. Also included are demands for excessive or unearned reimburse-
ments to private medical organizations. 
In January 2008, Domenico Crea, a member of Parliament and a phy-
sician, and his son Antonio Crea, managing director of the Villa Anya 
nursing clinic in Melito Porto Salvo, which had an agreement with the 
regional health service in Calabria, were arrested, along with Antonio 
Iacopino, head of the political administration of Councilor Crea and also 
medical director of the clinic. The following were put under house arrest: 
Giuseppe Biamonte, interim director of the councilor’s office for health; 
Pietro Morabito, ex-director of ASL 11 in Reggio Calabria and director of 
the provincial health board in Catanzaro; and Laura Autelitano, doctor 
and wife of Antonio Crea. Among those arrested were members of the 
Morabito clan and the Cordì clan, both of which are associated with the 
criminal ’Ndrangheta organization, accused, among other crimes, of 
the murder of Francesco Fortugno. Investigations revealing patronage 
between politics and the ’Ndrangheta led first to the commissioning 
of the ASL 9 in Locri and then to the inquiry into the “health mafia,” 
which found that the murder of Fortugno in October 2005 took place 
to safeguard consolidated alliances and illicit agreements.15 According 
to the charges, Councilor Crea was the lynchpin. He was the one sus-
pected of favoring the interests of the ’Ndrangheta in exchange for votes, 
whereas the election of Fortugno would not have guaranteed the same 
level of profits as envisaged with Crea in the region. Crea had to be 
made head of the regional council in order to allocate contracts and 
jobs with the complicity of Pietro Morabito, director of the Catanzaro 
ASL, and Giuseppe Biamonte, proxy director of the health division of 
the region of Calabria. All this was in order to divert millions of euros 
toward clinics of friends or family members, or to appoint a cousin, a 
brother, or a neighbor to the various health boards. 
Arrests in Abruzzo in July 2008 for medical mismanagement 
caused a scandal that again hit the health sector. The president of the 
region, Ottaviano Del Turco, was arrested, along with nine other peo-
ple, and accused of criminal association involved in aggravated fraud, 
extortion, forgery, and abuse of office. The inquiry also investigated 
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the second conversion of sums owed by the Abruzzo ASL to private 
clinics into public authority debentures. It should be remembered 
that Abruzzo was among the regions with the worst budgetary prob-
lems and that in June 2008 it was Del Turco himself who presented a 
new deficit reduction plan to the unified conference of the state and 
regions, in order to avoid the appointment of a special commissioner 
and an increase in the rates of IRPEF and IRAP taxes. 
The problem is that these scandals are the result of a widespread 
and long-standing type of behavior. Reviewing the last two decades, 
when the most significant SSN reforms were carried out, we can iden-
tify, along with measures to rationalize and reorganize the system, a 
series of events that show how widespread corruption and illegal pay-
ments are in this policy sector.16 
More recently, in 2002, a scandal blew up and several arrests were 
made at the Molinette Hospital of Turin over defective Brazilian-made 
cardiac valves, which were implanted in many patients during the 
1990s and caused several deaths. The investigation then extended 
from Turin to Padua. In February 2007, Michele Di Summa, a former 
chief medical officer at Molinette, was sentenced to nearly three years 
of imprisonment for bribery involving supplies of health equipment. 
In 2008, it was the turn of the ex-medical director of heart surgery in 
Padua, Dino Casarotto, who was sentenced to nearly six years for cor-
ruption, homicide, and grievous bodily harm to patients in whom he 
had implanted the defective heart valves. 
Further investigations in 2007 focused on Rome. One of the main 
figures was Anna Giuseppina Iannuzzi (nicknamed “Lady ASL”), a 
businesswoman in the health sector who made statements to the 
authorities that uncovered a network of bribes, which, over the years, 
had caused a loss of about 80 million euros in the Lazio region’s pub-
lic health funds. “Lady ASL” confessed to having paid bribes to politi-
cians, regional directors, and officials in order to obtain institutional 
accreditation and agreements, to cash unearned compensations by 
issuing false payment orders, and to receive EU funds for non-existent 
training courses. 
The public and decision-makers end up having a schizophrenic 
relationship with the health sector, characterized by sudden outbursts 
in the media, widespread indignation among the public, and bitter 
political controversy. This means that the frenzy of the days following 
the sudden discovery of health mismanagement goes hand in hand 
with new initiatives and intervention programs, such as setting up ad 
hoc commissions responsible for uncovering problems and suggesting 
solutions. This burst of activity, however, soon gives way to wide-
spread indifference. As a result, in the field of health service there is a 
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contrast between the experiences of the citizens, which vary substan-
tially in terms of quality of and access to health care, wherein the abil-
ity of individuals to take advantage of different opportunities offered 
by medical structures is crucial, and the responsibility of political 
institutions, which are too preoccupied with issuing “announcements 
for effect” (almost always ineffectual) and with the difficult task of 
making accounts balance.17
The Appointment of General Managers, Chief Medical  
Officers, and Assistant Medical Officers 
Another aspect of the relationship between health and politics, which 
had already become apparent at the end of 2007, was the appointment 
of general managers for local health authorities and hospital trusts 
and of chief medical officers for the latter. This controversy began in 
December 2007 with the appointment of general managers in Lom-
bardy. Of the 47 appointed by the center-right Lombardy Council, 44 
came from the Casa delle Libertà (to be exact, 26 from Forza Italia, 10 
from the Lega Nord, 6 from the Alleanza Nazionale, and 2 from the 
Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e di Centro), 1 came from the Partito 
Democratico, and only 2 were experts with no party allegiance.18 Their 
appointment was preceded by the publication on the region’s Web site 
of all 520 candidates who had put forward their candidacy, without 
making detailed curricula vitae available. 
In the regions of Piedmont and Liguria during the same period, the 
appointment of chief medical officers in the main hospital trusts came 
under discussion. The current practice is that whoever wins the elections 
chooses the general manager of health boards under the spoils system. 
The general manager in turn decides who will cover the key positions 
in health-care facilities: chief medical officers, heads of departments, 
and lower-level managers. The recent history of health care in Piedmont 
shows how this system worked during the 10 years of center-right gov-
ernment in the region and how it was immediately replicated by the cen-
ter-left government that followed. After a two-and-a-half year freeze on 
appointments, there was a race to fill vacant positions, which numbered 
100, including chief medical officers, heads of departments, and manag-
ers of basic health providers across Piedmont. In general, problems arise 
from the right of the public authority to appoint chief medical officers, 
the frequency of job advertisements that attract only one or two appli-
cants, the possibility of creating new head consultancies in addition to 
those in existence, and the fact that these appointments (like those for 
general managers) are closely linked to political competition. 
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On the subject of the link between politics and general managers, 
an inquiry held in January 2008,19 carried out by the weekly publica-
tion Il Sole 24 Ore Sanità, stated that, following the regional election 
results in 2005, 62 percent of general managers of local health authori-
ties and hospital trusts were connected to the center-left, 34 percent 
were associated with the center-right, 3 percent were from local lists, 
and only 1 percent (i.e., three general managers) were experts with no 
particular party affiliation (see table 9.1). This issue was considered 
so significant that the then health minister, Livia Turco, immediately 
proposed a reform aimed at the swift approval of new regulations on 
the choice of general managers and the appointment of chief medical 
officers, taking these regulations from the bill on the quality and safety 
of the SSN proposed in November 2007. The aim, according to Minister 
Turco, was to “give citizens the confidence that managers administering 
public funds and doctors wielding scalpels with power over their lives 
should be the best and most efficient at their job and not the most able 
to win the support of some politician or other.”20
Above all, Minister Turco emphasized that there were two separate 
problems. One was the appointment of general managers, regarding 
which politics must continue to play a crucial role, albeit linked to 
transparent criteria for candidate selection. The selection of the other 
upper-level health officers and of doctors was another matter, because 
politicians should not be involved at all in the appointment process. 
It should, in fact, be the general managers’ responsibility to choose, 
completely independently and in their capacity as managerial heads 
of the health authority, the best people to collaborate with, including 
chief medical officers. 
Where general managers are appointed by the regional council, this 
must happen after a public announcement gives proper notice of the post 
available. Candidates should be selected by an expert committee, which 
then submits to the region a short list of the best applicants for final selec-
tion. Procedural transparency is ensured by publishing the decision-mak-
ing process on the Internet, including curricula vitae and evaluations. In 
addition, the whole process must be assessed by an external non-regional 
body, namely, the National Agency for Regional Health Services.
Regarding the appointment of chief medical officers, under the cur-
rent system candidate selection is limited to the identification of gen-
eral suitability to fill the role. As a result, the majority, if not all, of the 
candidates often prove suitable. This means that ultimately the general 
manager has absolute discretion and might be influenced by external 
pressures in favor of a particular candidate. The Turco law, by contrast, 
introduces a proper candidate selection procedure, carried out by a 
commission that is largely made up of members taken from among 
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the chief medical officers of the same discipline at a regional or supra-
regional level. This commission then provides the manager with a 
short list of three candidates. The general manager retains the power of 
appointment, but can choose only from among the three names given 
on the list provided by the experts, thus limiting the possibility that 
he or she is influenced or put under pressure by external factors. This 
whole procedure must also be published on the Internet to guarantee 
transparency and allow public scrutiny of the appointment process. 
The early elections in 2008 interrupted discussions on this bill. How-
ever, the Berlusconi government has stated its intention to change the 
appointment system (particularly that of chief medical officers) and to 
banish politics from the selection procedure. The plan is to change the 
commission in charge of assessing candidates for top positions (former 
chief medical officers and assistant medical officers). Currently, the 
commission can be made up of people who work in the health-care 
facility or clinic where there is the job vacancy. If the current govern-
ment’s proposal is approved, the commission would instead consist of 
two external chief medical officers, chosen at random, and the manag-
ing director of the medical institution. The commission must provide 
the general manager with a short list of three candidates, in order 
of merit, based on their résumés, interview performance, scientific 
publications, and educational qualifications. A list of suitable people, 
which in practice includes all candidates, would no longer be drawn 
up. Under the new system, the general manager would also need to 
justify any choice other than the first person on the short list. 
The issue of appointing general managers and chief medical offi-
cers, along with that of limiting health service costs, contributed to 
raising the level of conflict between the government and the regions, 
as the two took different positions. On one hand, the central govern-
ment aimed to shield the appointment process from political meddling. 
On the other hand, the regions, which spend almost two-thirds of 
their budget on health care, were against a government initiative that 
would affect their autonomy with regard to the health sector. Clearly, 
there are two different views of health sector management. The basic 
premise of the regional point of view is that health-care policies must 
be linked to health-care management, and thus decisions on closing 
or opening medical facilities or the appointment of general manag-
ers or chief medical officers must be the responsibility of councilors 
or heads of councils. This does not exclude the need to identify and 
implement different selection methods from those currently in place. 
From this point of view, the proposal by Piero Marrazzo, president of 
the Lazio region, has a twofold purpose. Either the regional councils 
continue to appoint general managers, but from a list compiled by a 
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third party, or candidates for the presidency must state during their 
electoral campaign which professionals will occupy the top positions 
within regional health institutions. Thus, in this as in other areas of 
public administration, the issues of selection, evaluation, and respon-
sibility remain the focus of a debate in which everyone agrees that the 
current situation is unsatisfactory, but a range of different positions 
regarding a possible reform of the system is expressed. 
Conclusion: Toward a Regional Partyocracy  
in the Health-Care System?
Following this examination of the problems faced by the Italian health-
care system, which finds itself caught between cost constraints, health 
mismanagement, and Mafia infiltration, it is worth drawing some gen-
eral conclusions on how the (perverse) relationship between health care 
and politics has changed since the 1990s. In that time, the Italian health-
care system has been the subject of many important reforms, which have 
redefined procedures and have decentralized to regions many responsi-
bilities that were previously dealt with by the central government. 
It is worth starting with Maurizio Ferrera’s analysis to consider this 
issue. Over 10 years ago, he described the Italian health-care system 
from its initial constitution to the beginning of the 1990s.21 How much 
of that analysis is still valid and can explain why, despite the changes 
made in the last 15 years, the influence of politics on the Italian health-
care system is still so marked? The political exploitation of health care 
was started in the 1950s by the Christian Democrats and was perfected 
during the 1960s by the center-left governments. It reached its zenith 
in the 1970s and 1980s with the involvement of the Italian Communist 
Party and the extension of sharing-out practices from a national to a 
sub-national level, involving the regions, on one hand, and the local 
health boards, on the other. Political exploitation, therefore, took place 
at both a national and a sub-national level, in both a visible and in an 
invisible, hidden form. 
The reforms of the 1990s gave rise to a process of regionalization 
and the creation of local entities, which, although intended to reduce 
the level of politicization, in fact shifted it toward the regions and the 
new local health authorities and health-care providers after 1994. But 
there are further differences compared to the pre-reform situation. As 
the recent scandals described earlier in this chapter demonstrate, the 
invisible exploitation of the health sector as a source of illegal, hidden 
funds was worse at the regional level and was often carried out by the 
health councilor and/or regional council. 
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All this has important implications for the measures aimed at ratio-
nalizing the health system. The cuts that were made possible at the 
beginning of the 1990s—thanks to a combination of national mea-
sures, often implemented by professionals, and increased regional 
responsibility—have become more difficult to implement, now that 
a significant proportion of resources is directly available at a regional 
level. In addition, some of the regional political personnel are still 
halfway between responsible behavior and a persistent “spending 
culture,” according to which “the local partyocracy can continue their 
distributive games relatively undisturbed, claiming as a badge of honor 
their ability to secure funds from the center, to allocate resources at 
the local level, or to falsify accounts.”22
Visible exploitation, a constant factor at the sub-national level, is 
closely connected to the increase in decisional, financial, and organi-
zational regional autonomy that has resulted from health-care decen-
tralization. Regions that have the power to do so seize the opportunity 
to appoint general managers and, in health-care facilities, health 
directors and chief medical officers who are politically close, so that, 
through them, the political exploitation of health care can continue, 
although within regional borders. 
The “reform of reforms” of 1992–1993 attempted to block this 
practice, but these institutional barriers, which were largely effective 
when the party system was being destructured, seem less efficient 
now that there are signs of consolidation of the parties, above all 
as concerns their leadership at the local level. Once the health-care 
reforms of the 1990s were underway, the dynamics of political exploi-
tation of health care shifted from a national to a sub-national level, 
which—contrary to expectations—brought forward “micro” rather 
than “meso” or “meta” interests.23 In the long term, these interests, as 
shown by the scandals that emerged during 2008, successfully evaded 
the constraints on expenditure and the measures aimed at rational-
izing the health system. 
The constellation of interests in favor of change during the 1990s was 
anti-universalist and anti-statist. In recent years, however, there has not 
been an equal pressure against partyocracy. On the contrary, after going 
through a phase of partyocracy at the national level, health care now 
seems largely characterized by a variety of regional partyocracies that 
carve up increasingly scarce resources. Contrary to what seemed to be 
a reasonable expectation and hope at the time, from the second half of 
the 1990s, the whole debate has been heavily re-politicized (as shown 
by events when, from 1996 to 2000, Rosy Bindi was minister of health), 
with the result that health mismanagement has continued to spread 
and politics still influences the workings of the health system.
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